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On “Value-Laden” Science 
 
Zina B. Ward 
 
Abstract: Philosophical work on values in science is held back by widespread ambiguity about 
how values bear on scientific choices. Here, I disambiguate several ways in which a choice can be 
value-laden and show that this disambiguation has the potential to solve and dissolve philosophical 
problems about values in science. First, I characterize four ways in which values relate to choices: 
values can motivate, justify, cause, or be impacted by the choices we make. Next, I put my 
proposed taxonomy to work, using it to clarify one version of the argument from inductive risk. 
The claim that non-epistemic values must play a role in scientific choices that run inductive risk 
makes most sense as a claim about values being needed to justify such choices. The argument from 
inductive risk is not unique: many philosophical arguments about values in science can be more 
clearly understood and assessed by paying close attention to how values and choices are related.  
 




1. Introduction  
Understanding the role of values in scientists’ choices is a central aim of contemporary 
philosophy of science. There is consensus that values play an important role in choices about 
experimental design and project selection. Ethical restrictions on how human and animal subjects 
are treated are widely accepted, and social values rightfully shape decisions about what research 
is pursued. Other kinds of value influence are broadly condemned. Wishful thinking, for example, 
is usually taken to be objectionable: scientists should not choose to accept a hypothesis simply 
because it would be good if it were true. Despite these areas of agreement, there is disagreement 
about the role of values in more “internal” stages of science, including in choices about the 
characterization of data, acceptance of hypotheses, and presentation of results.1 
In debates about these disputed areas, what it means for a particular kind of scientific choice 
to “involve” values or to be “value-laden” is taken to be self-evident. Yet this apparent agreement 
belies diverse understandings of what values contribute to choice: they “lead” scientists in 
particular directions; are “embedded” or “encoded” in scientific choices; “contribute to” or “factor 
into” choices; or can be “invoked” in choice, either “explicitly or implicitly.”2 In my view, the 
diversity of this terminology is revealing: there are in fact several distinct ways in which values 
relate to choices, giving rise to different conceptions of what it means for a choice to be value-
laden. My aim here is to show that pulling apart these senses of value-ladenness has the potential 
to reshape discussions about values in science. 
In the first half of the paper, I distinguish four ways in which values bear on choices 
(scientific or otherwise). These fall into two categories: values can provide reasons for choices, or 
they can stand in causal relationships with choices. In Section 2, I discuss how values can serve as 
 
1 In discussing these debates, I’ll follow previous work in using “values” to refer to non-epistemic values 
unless otherwise noted. Many doubt that the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic values is 
defensible (Rooney 1992), but for the sake of argument, I assume that some distinction in the vicinity exists. 
2 In order of citation: Schroeder (2017), Elliott (2011), Rolin (1998), Carrier (2013), McKaughan and Elliott 
(2015), Lacey (2010), Biddle and Kukla (2017).  
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either motivating or justifying reasons. Section 3 characterizes the ways in which values can be 
causally linked to a choice, roughly as causes or effects. This taxonomy, summarized in Section 
4, can be used to advance debates about values in science in at least two ways: by helping identify 
crosstalk between authors, and by facilitating clearheaded evaluation of philosophical claims. The 
second half of the paper illustrates this potential. In Sections 5–7, I deploy the taxonomy to advance 
discussion about one version of the argument from inductive risk. This is just one of the many 
philosophical problems that the taxonomy has the potential to solve or dissolve. 
 
2. Values Act as Reasons for Choice 
Let us now begin to distinguish the several different ways in which values bear on choices. 
First, it is common for values to provide reasons for choices. In this section, I’ll characterize two 
ways in which values can serve as reasons: they can motivate or justify a choice. Using two brief 
examples, I’ll show that the literature on values in science contains discussion of both relationships 
between values and choices.  
 
2.1 Values and Reasons  
 We often think of epistemic and non-epistemic values as giving scientists reasons to choose 
one option over another. For example, in deciding which theory to accept, a value for explanatory 
power provides a reason to select the theory that explains the most. When choosing a research 
project to pursue, a value for social welfare provides a reason to study tuberculosis rather than hair 
loss. A value for profit, however, provides a reason to study hair loss rather than TB. There is 
considerable philosophical disagreement about the precise nature of the relationship between 
values and reasons. Some argue that reasons and values are identical or at least necessarily 
connected (Bond 1983, Raz 1975/1990). Others believe that reasons are derived from values or 
that both are derived from natural properties of objects (Dancy 2000, Scanlon 1998). These 
subtleties do not matter here; all that is required for our purposes is the widely accepted idea that 
reasons are often rooted in or connected to values. To be non-committal about the exact nature of 
this relationship, I will speak of values “providing,” “serving as” or “acting as” reasons for 
choices.3  
A distinction is commonly drawn by philosophers of action between motivating reasons 
and justifying reasons for action (Baier 1958, Bond 1974). Reasons seem to play two different 
roles in practical reasoning: they motivate and they justify. Motivating reasons are “reasons for 
which a person does something,” and as such are tied to the person’s “desires, beliefs, and 
emotions” (Bond 1983, 30). Justifying reasons are “reasons for or against doing a thing” and so 
are “tied to the world beyond” (ibid., 30).4 For example, consider a politician who votes to expand 
healthcare benefits for elderly people. His motivating reason is that the expansion will benefit him 
financially, because he owns a nursing home company. Although his motivations are entirely 
selfish, there may nevertheless be a justifying reason for his action. We may imagine that his vote 
 
3 The idea that values can serve as reasons bears a superficial similarity to Douglas’s (2009) distinction between 
indirect and direct roles for values in science. When values play the direct role, they “act as reasons in themselves 
to accept a claim,” while in the indirect role, they “act to weigh the importance of uncertainty about the claim” 
(Douglas 2009, 96). Note that Douglas’s “direct role” for values is indexed to a particular kind of choice: values 
can only play a direct role in decisions about hypothesis acceptance. By contrast, the characterization here 
recognizes that values provide reasons for many different kinds of choices. 
4 Philosophers disagree about whether there are two distinct types of reasons or simply two different things 
reasons can do (Bond 1974, Dancy 2000, Alvarez 2010). I am sidestepping this debate by adopting the weaker 
idea that reasons (at least) play different roles in choice (see Section 4).   
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is justified by healthcare inequalities and deficiencies in elder care. The motivating and justifying 
reasons for the politician’s action are different (though they may be the same in other cases).   
An extension of the distinction between motivating and justifying reasons now suggests 
itself: values (acting as reasons) may motivate or justify choices. That is, a value can serve as a 
motivating reason or as a justifying reason for a choice. Discussion of both types of relationships 
between values and choices can be found in the literature on values in science. I’ll now take a 
closer look at each. 
 
2.2 Motivating Reasons 
Values that serve as motivating reasons for a choice motivate the agent who is making the 
choice. E.J. Bond (1974) notes that motivating reasons need not be conscious or arrived at through 
deliberation. We can likewise say that values that serve as motivating reasons need not be explicitly 
endorsed by the person who holds them. The first way in which a choice may be value-laden, then, 
is if it is motivated, consciously or unconsciously, by values.  
Margaret Morrison is one author who seems to think of values as providing motivating 
reasons for scientific choices (for other examples, see Section 6.1). In her (2014) “Values and 
Uncertainty in Simulation Models,” she argues that although computational modeling is inevitably 
shaped by subjective elements, it can and should be insulated from values. Morrison associates 
subjectivity with between-researcher disagreement and a lack of algorithmic decision-making 
(Morrison 2014, 941, 948). She insists on the distinction between “the subjective features 
of…judgements and possible socio-economic or political motivations” (ibid., 950; my italics). The 
latter she calls “values.” This suggests that Morrison is thinking of values as motivating scientific 
choices. Further evidence comes from her discussion of the Sleipner accident, which occurred 
when the gravity base structure of an offshore platform sunk in the North Sea because its walls 
were too thin. Morrison argues that, although those who designed the platform made poor 
“subjective” decisions, they did not do so because they were trying to cut costs or minimize 
construction time. Since there were no values in their “underlying motivation,” the design process 
did not involve values (ibid., 949). Morrison’s general claim is that even though modeling requires 
judgment calls, values need not (and should not) serve as motivating reasons for the choices 
modelers make.5 
 
2.3 Justifying Reasons 
A second way in which values can bear on choices is by serving as justifying reasons for 
those choices, that is, reasons for or against doing something. I take justifying reasons to be pro 
tanto or “contributory” reasons rather than “all-things-considered” reasons, following Dancy 
(2000) and others. This means that there can be justifying reasons favoring alternative courses of 
action. For example, a reason to model climate change in one way might be that it is 
computationally inexpensive. A reason to model it in a different, incompatible way might be that 
bugs could be easily detected. These are both justifying reasons even though they speak in favor 
of different choices, one of which may be less justified overall. The same can be said of values 
that provide justifying reasons for a choice. A value for computational efficiency favors the first 
climate modeling option even if it is ultimately outweighed by a value for error detection which 
 
5 Note that this conception of the relationship between values and choices is dissociable from the content of 
Morrison’s claims. Being interested in a particular way that values bear on choices does not commit one to any 
particular view of values in science. 
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favors the second. The idea that values can act as justifying reasons gives rise to a second sense of 
value-ladenness: a choice is value-laden if it is justified by appeal to values.  
Several philosophers of science seem to be interested in how values can serve as reasons 
that justify choices. Eric Winsberg is one example. In part of his (2012) “Values and Uncertainties 
in the Predictions of Global Climate Models,” Winsberg argues that climate modelers have to 
make “literally thousands” of what he calls “unforced” methodological choices (130). These are 
modeling choices in which one option is not “objectively better” than the alternatives, so the 
researcher must exercise her discretion in selecting one (ibid., 130). Winsberg argues that unforced 
choices in climate modeling reflect non-epistemic values: 
[S]uch choices can only be defended against some set of predictive preferences and some 
balance of inductive risks. In other words, any rational reconstruction of the history of 
climate science would have to make mention of predictive preferences and inductive risks 
at pain of making most of these choices seem arbitrary…I do not mean to attribute to the 
relevant actors these psychological motives, nor any particular specifiable or recoverable 
set of interests. I am not in the business of making historical, sociological, or psychological 
claims. (ibid., 131) 
Winsberg is arguing that the full justification of climate scientists’ choices would have to appeal 
to values. His disavowal of any interest in scientists’ motivations, plus his reference to “rational 
reconstruction,” reveal that he is thinking about values in their capacity as justifying reasons. 
Values must be appealed to, he argues, to tell a story about climate modeling that rationalizes its 
trajectory. Hence, when Winsberg claims that there is “value-ladenness…in all the nooks and 
crannies” of climate modeling, he means that a thorough justification of the choices made by 
modelers would require frequent appeal to values (ibid., 132).6 (I’ll return to this argument in 
Section 6.2.) 
 Thus far, we have seen two different ways in which values relate to choices, both of which 
involve values acting as reasons. Although the foregoing characterizations suffice for our 
purposes, there are open philosophical questions about these relationships. Must values be good 
values to serve as justifying reasons for a choice? Does a value need to be accessible to the agent 
in order to provide a justifying reason for her choice? Are motivating reasons just a subset of 
justifying reasons, or are there values that motivate but do not justify a choice? As these questions 
touch on deep disagreements about the nature of reasons themselves, I leave them open here. 
 
3. Values are Causally Implicated in Choice 
 In addition to providing reasons, values may enter into causal relationships with choices. 
Crudely put, values can be causes or effects. More carefully, values can act as causal effectors, 
bringing about particular choices, or as affected goods, being impacted by choices that are made. 
In this section, I’ll characterize these two causal relationships (and their corresponding notions of 
value-ladenness) and again illustrate each with an example.  
 
3.1 Causal Effectors 
 
6 Winsberg’s mention of “predictive preferences” might seem to indicate that he is thinking of values as 
motivating scientists’ choices, but the rest of the passage makes clear that he doesn’t mean scientists’ actual 
preferences. He is referencing an earlier argument that modelers often have to choose which variables they want 
their complex models to predict most accurately (ibid., 124). When Winsberg references “predictive 
preferences,” then, he only means that scientists’ methodological choices must be defended by appeal to claims 
about which prediction task is most important. 
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 Values are often thought to have causal efficacy: they can bring about certain outcomes. 
This is shorthand for the idea that the possession of values makes a difference to the choices people 
make. To make such claims is to be interested in values in their capacity as causal effectors. A 
third way in which a choice can be claimed to be value-laden, then, is if it is causally influenced 
by someone’s possession of a value. 
Some authors argue that when values play a role in project selection or experimental 
design, value influence filters through the rest of the research process, making downstream 
decisions like hypothesis appraisal value-laden (Elliott and McKaughan 2009, Biddle and 
Winsberg 2010). These kinds of arguments concern values in their role as causal effector. One 
example is Robyn Bluhm’s (2017) “Inductive Risk and the Role of Values in Clinical Trials.” 
Bluhm discusses three controversies about the design of randomized controlled trials (RCTs): 
whether studies should be randomized, whether RCTs should be explanatory or pragmatic, and 
whether placebo controls should be used. She argues that these three debates have “implications 
for the relationship between values and evidence” (Bluhm 2017, 208). Bluhm aims to refute 
Heather Douglas’s (2000) claim that values are irrelevant to whether a piece of evidence confirms 
a hypothesis. She argues, 
[Douglas’s] sharp separation between evidence and values does not work. This is because 
ethical (as well as epistemological) values influence the methods chosen by clinical 
researchers. In turn, methodological choices shape the data collected and thus the evidence 
available to confirm (or fail to confirm) the hypotheses being considered…[T]he 
relationship between evidence and hypothesis is [therefore] influenced by values because 
the data themselves depend on methodological decisions that are defended on both ethical 
and epistemological grounds. (ibid., 208-9)  
On Bluhm’s view, decisions about hypothesis acceptance are value-laden because they are based 
on evidence collected from studies whose design was shaped by values. This argument concerns 
the causal link between values and scientific choices. Bluhm is pointing out that value-laden 
scientific choices early on have a causal impact down the road. Since she takes this to undermine 
Douglas’s claim that evidential relevance is value-free, she is interested in a distinctly causal 
conception of value-ladenness.  
 One might wonder whether there is a difference between values causally influencing a 
choice and values motivating a choice. On some accounts of reasons, motivating reasons have 
causal power and therefore serve as causal effectors as well (Davidson 1963). If this view is 
correct, any value that serves as a motivating reason for a choice also serves as a causal effector 
of that choice. However, the converse is not true. A value can causally influence a choice without 
motivating it, as Bluhm’s examples show. Consider a clinical researcher who is motivated by a 
value for patient welfare to conduct an RCT with an active control rather than a placebo. Her 
results are affected by this choice: she is less likely to gather evidence of the new treatment’s 
relative effectiveness than if she had used a placebo. Consequently, she is less likely to reject the 
null hypothesis. Her decision to accept or reject the null is therefore causally influenced by her 
possession of a value for patient welfare, even though patient welfare doesn’t directly motivate her 
acceptance or rejection.  
 It may also be possible for values to exert a causal influence on a choice without playing a 
motivational role at all. One might argue that this is the best characterization of some of the 
problematic episodes in twentieth-century science analyzed by feminist philosophers of science. 
In primatology, for example, the sexist values of primatologists affected how they interpreted 
primate behaviors, leading them to ignore alternative explanations and not search for evidence 
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contrary to prevailing narratives about sexuality and social organization (Longino 1990, Lloyd 
2005). One could argue that primatologists’ sexist values exerted this causal influence without 
directly motivating their individual actions. Consider the fact that researchers observing female 
primates interpreted the females’ sexual behavior through an entirely reproductive lens, and did 
not entertain alternative frames. They simply saw the behavior as playing a role in reproduction. 
One might think this wasn’t a matter of motivation at all. Sexist values may have affected the 
researchers’ observations, but they didn’t motivate them to see things in a certain way, consciously 
or unconsciously. Even though the primatologists would have acted differently had they not 
possessed sexist values, the values did not serve as motivating reasons for their actions. Whether 
this reconstruction is plausible depends on how one thinks about motivation. (I suspect it may 
ultimately be untenable.) But given that it is an open question whether values can act as causal 
effectors without serving as motivating reasons, our taxonomy should include both relationships 
between values and choices. 
 
3.2 Affected Goods 
 In addition to exerting a causal influence, values may themselves be impacted by choices. 
This is the second causal relationship between values and choices: values are affected by what we 
choose. Because of the social authority of science, scientific choices influence a wide range of 
values, including public health, environmental preservation, and individual and corporate wealth. 
For some, talking about values in science is a way of talking about these profound impacts. When 
these authors say that parts of science involve values, they highlight how those parts affect the 
things we deem important. When they claim that scientific choices promote values, they mean that 
those choices facilitate the flourishing of certain goods in the world.  
This conception of the relationship between values and choices is pervasive but often 
hidden, appearing mostly in the background of work on values in science. It is visible, however, 
in Kevin Elliott’s (2017) A Tapestry of Values: An Introduction to Values in Science. Elliott argues 
that, in many parts of science, “regardless of the motivations of the scientists, their choices support 
some social values while weakening others” (Elliott 2017, 13; see also Kitcher 2001, 2011). As an 
illustration, he discusses the work of Theo Colborn, who pioneered the study of endocrine-
disrupting chemicals in her book Our Stolen Future. Elliott claims that even if Colborn didn’t 
decide to write Our Stolen Future “with the goal of supporting a particular set of values, her choice 
served the value of promoting public health over alternative values, such as promoting the short-
term economic growth of the chemical industry” (Elliott 2017, 12). More generally, Elliott argues 
that “it is virtually inevitable that [scientists’] standards of evidence will be value-laden, in the 
sense that they will serve some social values rather than others” (ibid., 99). On this fourth 
(somewhat unorthodox) definition of value-ladenness, then, any action that affects things that are 
valued is value-laden. Whenever a scientist’s choice promotes some goods over others, even 
indirectly or unintentionally, values are said to be involved.  
 One might think that conceiving of value-ladenness in this way is not particularly useful. 
Michael Scriven (1972) makes the point in a colorful passage: “‘Science is not value free,’ the 
radical is fond of saying… True enough, true of scientists, and of science as a social phenomenon. 
But never denied by the value-free supporter, who was only arguing that the content of science is 
value free, not that its effect has no social significance” (246-7). Scriven is right that some 
polemical claims about values in science turn out to be mundane once we realize that they are 
about values in their capacity as affected goods. But he is wrong to suggest that all claims about 
values as affected goods are trivial. Pointing out that specific scientific choices advance specific 
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values can be surprising and consequential. For instance, consider a social scientist who is 
conducting educational research, the results of which will have an influence on policy. Imagine 
that if he uses stratified sampling, he is more likely to reach a conclusion that favors school choice; 
whereas if he uses random sampling, his findings will likely strengthen the case for public 
education. Since his choice of sampling technique impacts educational equity and child well-being, 
it is value-laden in Elliott’s (2017) sense. There are many other examples of apparently innocent 
methodological choices that turn out to have significant consequences. Calling attention to these 
choices is philosophically and practically important.  
 
4. Four Relationships Between Values and Choices 
Our taxonomy of the ways in which values bear on choices is summarized in Table 1. 
Although my focus has been on non-epistemic values in science, note that this taxonomy is fully 
general: it characterizes four different ways that values (of any kind) bear on choices (in any 
domain, even outside of science). I do not claim to have described all of the possible relationships 
between values and choices. Nevertheless, within the two broad categories, the subdivisions appear 
to be exhaustive. When values serve as reasons, they either motivate or justify choices. (That is an 
implication of the dominant view among philosophers of action, anyway.7) When values play a 
causal role, they either influence or are impacted by choices.  
One might claim that there are not only several different relationships between values and 
choices, but several distinct kinds of things we call values. The latter, more metaphysically 
ambitious view would hold that values are not one sort of entity, but four. This position mirrors a 
view about the nature of reasons mentioned briefly in Section 2.1. Some authors believe motivating 
and justifying reasons are metaphysically distinct: they are two “quite different sorts of thing” 
(Bond 1974, 333). Others argue that there are just two “senses” of reason or two “roles” that 
reasons play (Baier 1958, Dancy 2000, Alvarez 2010). I have offered a taxonomy that is neutral 
about the ontology of values because my arguments below only require greater attention to what 
values do, not what they are.8 
 
Values serve as reasons for making choices. Values stand in causal relations with choices. 
Motivating Reasons Justifying Reasons Causal Effectors Affected Goods 
Values motivate an 
agent to make a 
choice. 
Values justify a 
choice. 
Values causally 
impact a choice. 
Values are promoted 
or undermined by a 
choice. 
Table 1. Four ways in which values relate to choices.9 
 
7 One exception is Alvarez (2010), who suggests that there is a third category of explanatory reasons alongside 
motivating and justifying reasons. She argues that some reasons that explain an action may not motivate it, as 
in: the reason the tulips died is that the temperature dropped. Such examples strike me as straightforward causal 
explanations in which talk of reasons shouldn’t be taken literally. A value that Alvarez would count as providing 
an explanatory reason is one that serves as a causal effector on my account. 
8 I thank an anonymous reviewer for encouraging me to pursue the ontologically neutral approach. 
9 The major division in this taxonomy between reasons and causes may call to mind Intemann’s (2008) 
distinction between “treating values as a-rational causal forces that merely influence scientific reasoning” and 
thinking of values as “operating as reasons themselves” (1071; see also Melo-Martín and Intemann 2016). 
Although there are clear similarities between my taxonomy and Intemann’s distinction, her narrow concern with 
underdetermination arguments contrasts with my more general aim of characterizing the different ways values 
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This four-fold distinction gives rise to four different senses of value-ladenness: a choice 
may be said to be value-laden if it (1) is motivated by values; (2) is justified by values; (3) is 
causally affected by the possession of values; or (4) advances or undermines values. (In discussions 
of values in science, ‘values’ here refers to non-epistemic values.) There are open questions about 
how different senses of value-ladenness are themselves related (see Sections 2.3 and 3.1). If a 
choice is value-laden in the first sense, for example, it is arguably also value-laden in the third 
sense (Davidson 1963). Thus, although these understandings of value-ladenness are conceptually 
distinct, many choices are value-laden in multiple respects. 
Equivocation about the relationship between values and choices has led to rampant 
confusion and misunderstanding in the literature on values in science. Different philosophers 
implicitly adopt competing conceptions of value-ladenness, and even within a single paper, authors 
frequently slide between different senses. Crosstalk is the inevitable result. For instance, someone 
who is thinking of values in their capacity as causal effectors might (correctly) argue that values 
influenced the decision to accept or reject a particular hypothesis on the grounds that acceptance 
was made more or less likely by a prior methodological decision shaped by values. Someone 
thinking about values as motivating reasons might (correctly) deny that values played a role in that 
very same decision because the scientist was not motivated by values in accepting or rejecting the 
hypothesis.  
In what follows, I will zoom in on one discussion that has been significantly clouded by 
lack of clarity about the role of values in choices: the debate over the argument from inductive risk 
(AIR). Section 5 introduces what I call the “must” version of AIR, which I abbreviate AIRm. In 
Section 6, I show that advocates and opponents of AIRm frequently think about the relationship 
between values and choices in different ways. I assess the different possible interpretations of 
AIRm in Section 7, suggesting that the argument is really about which scientific choices must be 
justified and what that justification involves. As such, however, the argument depends on a notion 
of scientific justification that has yet to be clearly articulated or defended. By reframing the 
discussion of AIRm, these remaining sections illustrate the philosophical payoff of using the 
taxonomy above to clarify and assess claims about values in science. 
 
5. The Argument from Inductive Risk 
The phrase “inductive risk,” coined by Carl Hempel (1954, 1965), refers to the potential 
consequences of mistakenly accepting a false claim or rejecting a true one. Richard Rudner (1953) 
provides the canonical formulation of AIR:  
[S]ince no scientific hypothesis is ever completely verified, in accepting a hypothesis the 
scientist must make the decision that the evidence is sufficiently strong or that the 
probability is sufficiently high to warrant the acceptance of the hypothesis. Obviously our 
decision regarding the evidence and respecting how strong is ‘strong enough’, is going to 
be a function of the importance, in the typically ethical sense, of making a mistake in 
accepting or rejecting the hypothesis.10 (2) 
 
and choices are related. Moreover, I am doubtful that our distinctions overlap exactly given that Intemann also 
glosses hers in terms of the instrumental versus intrinsic use of values. In addition, Intemann does not subdivide 
the two categories as I have done here. Hence, even if Intemann is gesturing at the same overarching distinction, 
the taxonomy in Table 1 provides a more thorough disambiguation. 
10 Rudner is presupposing a certain picture of scientific inference which I’ll grant for the sake of argument. There 
has been considerable discussion, however, about whether Bayesians can escape the argument from inductive 
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Adopting a high evidential threshold for acceptance of hypotheses increases the chance of 
mistakenly rejecting a true hypothesis, while adopting a lower threshold increases the chance of 
mistakenly accepting a false hypothesis. Scientists must strike a balance between these false 
negatives and false positives. Rudner’s claim is that the tradeoff is shaped by value-laden 
assessments of the consequences of each type of error. As an example, he compares the hypothesis 
that a drug is non-toxic with the hypothesis that a batch of belt buckles is not defective. He argues 
that “we would require a relatively high degree of confirmation” before accepting the former 
hypothesis because “the consequences of making a mistake here are exceedingly grave by our 
moral standards” (ibid., 2). We need not be as cautious with the latter because the consequences 
of mistaken acceptance are not as serious. Decisions to accept or reject hypotheses like these are 
said to “run” inductive risk, meaning that potential errors have practical consequences outside of 
science. Although Rudner does not use the language of epistemic values, recent authors have taken 
AIR to establish that choices about the acceptance and rejection of scientific hypotheses that run 
inductive risk involve non-epistemic values.11 
 Rudner’s simple formulation belies considerable complexity in AIR, particularly regarding 
the strength of its conclusion. There are at least four versions of the argument that make different 
claims.12 First, there is a version of AIR that is normative: it asserts that values should be 
considered when scientists make decisions about hypothesis acceptance that run inductive risk. 
Authors who discuss this “should” version of AIR include Heather Douglas (2009) and Daniel 
Steel (2010). A second, “can” version of AIR claims that values can permissibly enter into such 
choices: scientists have the moral discretion to make use of values or not. This position is not 
currently represented in the literature. The third version asserts that values must (in a non-moral 
sense) play a role in choices about hypothesis acceptance that run inductive risk. The “must” 
version of AIR is arguably defended by Richard Rudner (1953) and Justin Biddle and Rebecca 
Kukla (2017). Finally, there is a descriptive, “do” reading of AIR. It says that scientists do navigate 
(or have navigated) inductive risk tradeoffs using values. Kent Staley (2017) develops this kind of 
argument, presenting evidence that values played a role in physicists’ decision to accept the 
discovery of the Higgs boson.  
These four versions of AIR are frequently conflated. Here I am interested in the strongest: 
the “must” version, which I abbreviate AIRm. Recent debates about AIRm have been held back by 
lack of clarity about what it means for choices that run inductive risk to “involve values.” It is only 
by distinguishing between different ways in which values bear on such choices that we can get a 
handle on what philosophers mean when they say that values must (or conversely, need not) enter 
in to science. 
 
6. Advocates and Opponents of AIRm 
Much discussion of AIRm concerns an objection first raised in Isaac Levi’s (1960) response 
to Rudner (1953). Opponents of AIRm argue that epistemic values alone suffice to trade off 
 
risk (Jeffrey 1956, Steel 2015). I will also follow Rudner in treating the acceptance and rejection of a hypothesis 
as exhaustive options, ignoring the possibility of suspension of judgment (even though, to use the language of 
hypothesis testing, failing to reject a null hypothesis is not the same as accepting it). 
11 The Rudnerian argument from inductive risk focuses on hypothesis acceptance. Many philosophers now argue 
that AIR applies more widely because there is inductive risk throughout the research process (Douglas 2000, 
2009). Recent years have seen a backlash to this expanded definition of inductive risk (Biddle 2016, Biddle and 
Kukla 2017). I will sidestep this debate by focusing on hypothesis acceptance. 
12 Betz (2013), Steel (2016), and others distinguish some but not all of these versions of AIR. 
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inductive risks, while proponents insist that non-epistemic values need to supplement the epistemic 
ones. I will now show that the objection to AIRm focuses on what is required to motivate scientific 
choices, while the reply is concerned with what it takes to justify them. In this section, I’ll present 
these two interpretations of AIRm. In the next section, I’ll evaluate them. 
 
6.1 Opponents of AIRm 
In Levi’s (1960) response to Rudner, he grants that scientists must set “minimum 
probabilities” for accepting or rejecting hypotheses but argues that these thresholds need not reflect 
non-epistemic values (347). If they are instead dictated by “‘scientific’ standards of inference,” the 
value-neutrality of science can be preserved (ibid., 356). Several contemporary authors, including 
Sandra Mitchell (2004), have taken up this objection to AIRm, arguing that epistemic values alone 
can be used to trade off potential errors. Mitchell criticizes Douglas’ (2000, 2003) claim that 
policy-relevant science is necessarily shot through with non-epistemic values. She argues that 
scientists can decide whether to accept causal claims by appeal to a broad set of epistemic values, 
which includes “variety of evidence, accuracy of measurement, and replication of experimental 
results… accuracy of prediction, problem-solving ability, simplicity, and scope” (Mitchell 2004, 
248-9). Mitchell recognizes that epistemic values might not “uniquely determine” whether a 
scientific claim should be accepted but argues that “nevertheless, if the scientists…make 
judgments employing only…broadly epistemic or cognitive values, then there is no necessity for 
values outside this set to enter the process” (ibid., 249). Scientists can manage inductive risk in 
policy-relevant science using only epistemic values. 
 Stephen John (2015) makes a similar argument in his discussion of the role of values in the 
work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The IPCC has to make decisions 
about whether or not to include particular pieces of evidence in its periodic Assessment Reports. 
These decisions are subject to false positives and false negatives, John claims, in the sense that 
false evidence might be wrongly included or true evidence wrongly excluded. He argues that the 
IPCC’s errors have significant practical consequences, so its decisions about evidence inclusion 
run inductive risk (cf. Betz 2013). However, John suggests that the IPCC navigates such inductive 
risk trade-offs using epistemic values alone. John takes epistemic values to be values about the 
importance of knowledge. He argues that the IPCC’s decisions about evidence inclusion are 
shaped by a concern for safety in Pritchard’s (2005) sense: the IPCC wants to employ a method 
that ensures that it only makes claims when those claims are true in nearby possible worlds. Safety 
is an important aspect of knowledge, so the IPCC’s decisions about evidence inclusion reflect 
epistemic values. John’s argument entails a rejection of AIRm even though he does not frame it as 
such. His claim that the IPCC’s error balancing reflects epistemic values amounts to a denial that 
non-epistemic values are needed to trade off inductive risks.13 
 Mitchell and John’s objections to AIRm are best understood as claims about what it takes 
to motivate scientific choices. This can be seen in Mitchell’s assertion that, “it is crucial to keep 
[epistemic and non-epistemic] values distinct although they may be embodied in a single 
individual,” which suggests that values are serving as part of an individual’s motivational structure 
(2004, 251; my italics). Motivating reasons are properly said to belong to an agent whereas 
justifying reasons can only be acted on or responded to by him. The passage also expresses the 
worry that different types of values might be confused for one another, a concern that makes most 
 
13 John suggests that he is deploying AIR rather than challenging it. This is because he takes the argument to 
establish that values of some kind must enter in to certain scientific choices. Most authors, however, take it to 
support the involvement of non-epistemic values in particular. 
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sense in the context of motivation: it can be difficult to tell which of her values motivated a scientist 
to endorse a certain hypothesis. Furthermore, Mitchell disputes Douglas’s (2000, 2003) claim that 
non-epistemic values were the source of specific historical disagreements among scientists, 
arguing instead that epistemic values were likely responsible. To think of divergent values as a 
“source of disagreement” is to think of different values as motivating different people (Mitchell 
2004, 248). On the most natural reconstruction of her arguments, then, Mitchell is thinking of 
values in their capacity as motivating reasons. John claims that IPCC authors’ decisions about 
evidence inclusion are “guided by” epistemic values, emphasizing that the organization’s “inner 
workings are not themselves based on ethical or political values” (2015, 11). One can read these 
passages as claiming that the scientists preparing IPCC Assessment Reports have epistemic 
motivating reasons to include the evidence that they do. John’s frequent use of “preference” as a 
synonym for “value” reinforces this interpretation, since our preferences motivate our decisions. 
Hence, John too seems most concerned with which values motivate the choices of scientists.14  
On an interpretation that focuses on values’ role in motivating scientific choices, AIRm 
asserts that non-epistemic values must (in a non-moral sense) motivate scientists who face 
decisions that run inductive risk. Mitchell and John reject this, arguing that it is possible for 
scientists’ choices to be motivated by epistemic considerations alone.15 
 
6.2 Advocates of AIRm 
Advocates of AIRm deny that epistemic values are sufficient for balancing inductive risks. 
Their response to Levi-inspired objections is typically that epistemic values do not uniquely 
determine where to set evidential thresholds. Epistemic values require interpretation and active 
application (Kuhn 1977, McMullin 1982). Hypotheses do not wear their degree of scope or 
simplicity on their sleeve, in part because there are different ways of operationalizing them. 
Moreover, epistemic values can pull in different directions. For instance, prioritizing fruitfulness 
sometimes detracts from explanatory power. Scientists using epistemic values therefore have to 
weigh them against one another. According to some authors (e.g. Rooney 1992), interpreting and 
trading epistemic values requires non-epistemic judgment. Because epistemic values do not 
function as algorithms, they cannot be deployed without non-epistemic values. The same situation 
arises if, following John (2015), we take epistemic values to be values for knowledge. There are 
different ways that one can prioritize knowledge and different aspects of knowledge that are in 
tension with one another (James 1896, Kelly 2013). To put the point in the language John uses, to 
have knowledge we must seek safety, which requires us to be cautious in believing things. And 
yet, we must also have true beliefs. But valuing the acquisition of safe beliefs and valuing the 
acquisition of true beliefs pull in different directions, the latter recommending that we believe 
claims liberally and the former recommending the opposite. 
No matter how we think about epistemic values, then, they often fail to uniquely dictate 
choices about hypothesis acceptance. Authors who ground their defense of AIRm in this failure 
 
14 As noted in Section 4, authors often switch between different conceptions of the relationship between values 
and choices within a single paper, so it can be difficult to find one consistent interpretation of a given argument. 
In arguing that Mitchell and John should be interpreted as making a claim about values in their capacity as 
motivating reasons, I am merely suggesting that such an interpretation makes sense of the majority of what they 
say and contributes to the most plausible reading of their arguments. 
15 One can read Mitchell and John as rejecting AIRm in service of a normative argument: their ultimate aim is to 
show that researchers shouldn’t use non-epistemic values to manage inductive risk in policy-relevant science or 
IPCC Report preparation, respectively. I leave this normative extension to one side, since I am only discussing 
the “must” version of AIR here, not the “should” version. 
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tend to focus on values acting as justifying reasons for such choices. Winsberg (2012), discussed 
in Section 2.3, is one example. He advances a similar argument with Bryce Huebner and Rebecca 
Kukla in a (2014) paper on values in collaborative research. Winsberg et al. (2014) discuss 
“justificatory stories,” “rational reconstruction,” and “defending” methodological decisions, 
language that shows the authors’ focus on justification rather than motivation (19-20). They argue 
that “no unforced methodological choices can be defended in a value vacuum. There is no set of 
shared standards that dictates them” (ibid., 20). Unforced choices, which “shared” epistemic 
criteria cannot justify, “seem completely arbitrary” unless non-epistemic values are invoked to 
defend them (ibid., 20). This emphasis on defending scientific choices indicates that Winsberg and 
colleagues take AIRm to establish a necessary role for values in their capacity as justifying reasons 
in science.  
The same can be said of other proponents of the argument. Rudner (1953) claims that “any 
adequate analysis or (if I may use the term) rational reconstruction of the method of science” must 
involve value judgments (4; my italics). Douglas (2017a) likewise argues that scientists’ choices 
about whether there is sufficient evidence to accept a claim need to involve non-epistemic values 
to be “nonarbitrary.” Instead of appealing to conflict between epistemic values, she claims that 
epistemic values simply do not speak to the issue of whether “the evidence you have is strong 
enough to make a claim at a particular point in time” (Douglas 2017a, 83). Since epistemic values 
are not “designed” to address questions about evidential sufficiency, non-epistemic values must 
be invoked to justify the adoption of a given threshold (ibid., 83). Hence, advocates take AIRm to 
assert that non-epistemic values must be invoked to justify scientific decisions about the 
acceptance or rejection of hypotheses that run inductive risk when (or given that) those decisions 
are not dictated by epistemic values alone.  
Opponents and advocates of AIRm, who seem to be in dialogue with one another, are in 
fact talking about entirely different arguments. Opponents are rejecting a claim about scientists’ 
motivations, while proponents are endorsing a claim about what it takes to justify scientific 
choices. This lack of contact is the result of emphasizing different ways in which values bear on 
choices. By paying closer attention to the relationship between values and choices, we have 
identified two competing interpretations of AIRm concerning motivating and justifying reasons. 
Bond (1974) argues that conflation of motivating and justifying reasons “has led to serious error 
in ethics and philosophy of action” (333). In light of this ongoing crosstalk about AIRm, philosophy 
of science can be added to Bond’s list. 
 
7. An Assessment of AIRm  
 We have now seen that the taxonomy proposed in Sections 2–4 can help diagnose 
misunderstandings and communication failures in the literature on values in science. What’s more, 
it can also facilitate more careful evaluation of philosophical claims. Putting aside exegetical 
issues, we can ask: is AIRm substantive and persuasive given any of the conceptions of value-
ladenness characterized above? I’ll argue in this section that the most plausible version of the 
argument is underdeveloped. The success of AIRm depends on when and where justification is 
required in science, a topic that has not yet been directly addressed by either party to the debate.    
Both interpretations of AIRm discussed in the previous section appeal to values in their 
capacity as reasons. Before assessing these interpretations, it is worth considering why there has 
been little discussion about AIRm rooted in either of the two causal relationships between values 
and choices. In my view, the problem with both causal interpretations is that they trivialize AIRm. 
If values are taken to be acting as causal effectors, AIRm asserts that non-epistemic values must 
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causally influence all choices about hypothesis acceptance that run inductive risk. This claim is 
hard to deny. As we saw in Section 3.1, values causally influence every decision about hypothesis 
acceptance that is based on evidence from studies whose design was shaped by non-epistemic 
concerns. Since the design of virtually all research is affected by considerations relating to 
feasibility, cost, convenience, ethics, and so on, the causal influence of values is felt throughout 
science. Indeed, assuming the decision to pursue any research project is influenced by the 
possession of values, every part of science is causally downstream of values. This understanding 
of AIRm is therefore undeniable and hence uninteresting. (This is not to deny that showing how 
the acceptance of a certain hypothesis was causally influenced by specific values can be 
interesting, a point made briefly in Section 3.2. The triviality only lies in the general claim that 
such influences must occur.) An interpretation of AIRm in terms of values serving as affected goods 
has a similar problem. It claims that hypothesis acceptance decisions that run inductive risk must 
have consequences for values. This version of AIRm is basically tautological. Recall that a choice 
is said to run inductive risk when potential errors have practical consequences outside of science. 
Any choice that runs inductive risk in this sense necessarily affects goods in the world. 
 Having dismissed both causal interpretations of AIRm, let’s now return to the two 
interpretations present in the existing literature. The reading of AIRm favored by Mitchell and John 
concerns the motivating reasons for scientists’ choices. On this interpretation, AIRm asserts that 
choices about the acceptance and rejection of hypotheses that run inductive risk must involve non-
epistemic values as motivating reasons. Opponents of AIRm are quite right to reject this claim. 
Non-epistemic values do not have to enter a scientist’s motivations no matter what kind of choice 
she faces. It is possible for a scientist to be entirely motivated by epistemic considerations even if 
potential errors carry tremendous practical consequences. A scientist can ignore the social and 
political dimensions of a choice and act on the basis of (her understanding of) epistemic values 
alone. One could try to deny this possibility by offering something akin to Colombo et al.’s (2016) 
empirical argument that scientists’ moral values are likely to bias their hypothesis appraisal. This 
does not seem like a promising strategy, however, since one would need to provide empirical 
evidence that non-epistemic values must motivate scientists’ choices, not that they usually do. 
 Hence, the only interpretation of AIRm that is both substantive and reasonably plausible is 
(unsurprisingly) the one favored by its proponents, which takes values to be acting as justifying 
reasons. On this reading, AIRm asserts that decisions about the acceptance and rejection of 
hypotheses that run inductive risk cannot be justified without non-epistemic values. This 
interpretation of the argument is intriguing but currently underdeveloped. Even if we grant that 
epistemic values must be operationalized and traded off, proponents have not yet established that 
epistemic values’ failure to uniquely justify scientific choices necessitates the involvement of non-
epistemic values. First, one might reject the idea that justification of a choice requires that one 
show that the chosen option is superior to all others. A choice can arguably be justified merely by 
citing reasons in its favor; one need not establish that the selected option is better than all the 
alternatives. If this is right, the fact that epistemic values underdetermine choices about hypothesis 
acceptance does not detract from the justification they provide.  
Second, the proposed defense of AIRm only works if we think about epistemic values as a 
set. Even when epistemic values taken together do not uniquely determine a scientific choice 
because they conflict, one interpretation of a single epistemic value might pick out a single option. 
For example, imagine that a scientist is deciding which of two competing hypotheses to accept. 
One hypothesis is the simplest and the other is the most fruitful (on some interpretation of 
simplicity and fruitfulness). Epistemic values as a set do not favor one option over the other, since 
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simplicity and fruitfulness pull in different directions. Single epistemic values, however, do 
discriminate between the options. Simplicity justifies acceptance of the first hypothesis and 
fruitfulness justifies acceptance of the second. Since individual epistemic values suffice to justify 
such choices, non-epistemic values are not needed. 
A proponent of AIRm would likely respond that this only pushes back the need for non-
epistemic values, since the prioritization of simplicity over fruitfulness (or vice versa) itself 
requires justification. But one need not grant this regress. An opponent of AIRm can argue that 
interpreting or trading off epistemic values in a particular way does not require justification. 
Justification of choices arguably has to stop somewhere; why not here? Alternatively, the opponent 
could accept that justification is needed but deny that non-epistemic values are the only justifiers. 
Perhaps other epistemic values, or something besides values entirely, can justify the application 
and weighing of epistemic values.  
These questions reveal that the debate over AIRm has been taking place on the wrong 
ground. Advocates and opponents of AIRm have both failed to recognize that the argument is 
essentially about when justification is needed in science and what it requires. To resist the replies 
suggested above, advocates of AIRm need to provide an independently motivated account of 
scientific justification. The account must explain which scientific choices have to be justified, and 
which requests for justification are unreasonable; what sorts of things are potential justifiers for 
any given choice; and why justifying some decisions requires an appeal to non-epistemic 
considerations. Opponents of AIRm, meanwhile, need an account of scientific justification on 
which epistemic values (or something besides values) can justify choices about hypothesis 
acceptance even when those choices have practical consequences. 
The need for explicit discussion of the nature of scientific justification can be illustrated by 
returning to Douglas’ (2017a) defense of AIRm. Recall that Douglas argues that epistemic values 
are not the kinds of things that can justify a judgment that the evidence is sufficient to accept a 
scientific claim. To believe otherwise is a kind of category mistake, she argues. Scientists’ 
justification of evidential sufficiency judgments therefore requires non-epistemic values. Even 
granting Douglas’ claim about the limits of epistemic values, her argument depends on contentious 
commitments about justification. First, she assumes that only values that can justify judgments of 
evidential sufficiency. Moving from the in-principle irrelevance of epistemic values to the need 
for non-epistemic values, as she does, only makes sense if justification requires values. Second, 
Douglas seems to assume that individual scientists judge whether the evidence is sufficient to 
accept a claim. But an objector could deny that scientists themselves make such judgments, 
perhaps because they only assess whether the evidence meets a conventional threshold for 
hypothesis acceptance (e.g. p £ 0.05). Douglas briefly considers this objection, citing evidence that 
different fields employ different statistical significance thresholds. The fact that such diversity 
exists does not, however, establish that scientists “need” to justify the thresholds they use, nor that 
the justification must appeal to “external concerns” (Douglas 2017a, 85). 
Understanding that AIRm is about the justification of scientific choices clarifies the terms 
of debate. It also helpfully recasts the discussion about a different objection to AIRm raised by Betz 
(2013, 2017) and Parker (2014). These authors argue that value influence in science can be 
avoided, or at least minimized, by changing the sorts of hypotheses that scientists accept. By 
“hedging” hypotheses and making them more coarse-grained, scientists can minimize their 
exposure to inductive risk, Betz and Parker claim. For instance, although deciding whether to 
accept a claim such as, “The earth’s temperature will rise by 3°C in the next 50 years” requires 
value-laden error trade-offs, accepting a claim like, “Given assumptions XYZ, it is likely that the 
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earth’s temperature will rise between 0.5°C and 7°C in the next 100 years” does not. If scientists 
weaken their hypotheses such that they become “virtually certain,” values need not be involved in 
hypothesis acceptance, refuting AIRm (Betz 2013, 218). The understanding of AIRm proposed here 
suggests that this objection should be assessed by considering how hedging changes what is needed 
to justify a claim. Does adding qualifiers and coarse-graining scientific hypotheses shift the bar 
for justification? If a hedged hypothesis is “virtually certain,” can its acceptance be justified by 
epistemic considerations alone? The success of Betz and Parker’s objection hinges on the answers 
to such questions. 
 
8. A Speculative Diagnosis 
 The preceding sections sought to make sense of the claim that non-epistemic values must 
(or conversely, need not) enter into decisions about hypothesis acceptance that run inductive risk. 
I argued that the debate over AIRm has been misdirected: since the most plausible interpretation of 
the argument concerns values in their capacity as justifying reasons, its fate depends on which 
scientific choices require justification and what is needed to justify them. Only by turning our 
attention to these broader issues can we determine whether non-epistemic values are required to 
justify decisions that run inductive risk. I hope that this discussion has shown the payoff of 
attending to the distinctions introduced earlier. We can use the taxonomy presented in Sections 2–
4 to pinpoint crosstalk between authors (Section 6) and evaluate philosophical arguments (Section 
7). The literature on AIRm is not unique in this respect. For example, I suspect that different 
conceptions of value-ladenness are partly responsible for the disagreements between Stéphanie 
Ruphy (2006) and Helen Longino (1990, 2002) about the role of feminist values in science, and 
between Bluhm (2017) and Douglas (2000) about values’ relevance to confirmation relations (see 
Section 3.1). Almost all work on values in science would benefit enormously from greater clarity 
about the different ways in which values bear on scientific choices. 
I am not the first to discuss ambiguities surrounding the notion of “value-ladenness” in 
philosophy of science. Scriven (1972) was an early and harsh critic: “If there is one set of 
arguments worse than those put forward for ‘value-free science’, it is those put forward against it. 
Both have one common characteristic, besides a high frequency of invalidity, and that is the failure 
to make any serious effort at a plausible analysis of the concept of ‘value judgment’” (219). Ernan 
McMullin (1982) also acknowledged the polysemy of “value,” arguing that it would be unwise to 
try to find a single notion applicable in all contexts. More recently, Biddle (2013) has argued that 
“the terminology of values is, at best, misleading,” suggesting that we adopt “contextual factor” 
instead (125). I disagree with Biddle’s recommendation but agree with his diagnosis.16 The 
terminology of values should not be abandoned, but we need to be clearer about what values are 
and how they relate to scientific choices. 
How did we end up with so much confusion about value-ladenness in the first place? I 
suspect the tendency to include an ever-greater variety of topics under the banner of “values in 
science” is partly to blame. Recent remarks by two prominent contributors to the literature support 
this speculative diagnosis. Douglas (2017b) argues that before the recent rediscovery of mid-
century work on inductive risk, “the role of science in society was not a central topic for 
 
16 Biddle argues that “in many situations, contextual factors that are not accurately described as values will 
invariably influence theory choice” (ibid., 131). For example, having a hangover is a contextual factor that could 
influence a scientist’s appraisal of a theory but is not a value. I agree that contextual factors are a more inclusive 
category than values but think we should preserve the latter. It is of little doubt that having a hangover is not a 
legitimate influence on theory choice, but the proper place of non-epistemic values in science is contested. 
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philosophers of science” (x). But raising questions about “the saturation of science with values” 
has “enabled the philosophy of science to address the role of science in society more robustly” 
(ibid., x). Longino (2004) similarly claims that “[m]uch philosophical discussion about the 
relationship of science to its social contexts is pursued under the rubric of values in science. This 
functions as a kind of catch-all for the messy and complex world of social relationships as it might 
bear on the practice of science” (128). 
There is a whiff of criticism in Longino’s observation, and rightly so. Much philosophical 
work on science and society has been framed in terms of values, perhaps because we lack the 
conceptual resources to do otherwise, or perhaps because “values in science” is a well-established 
topic in the field. This trend has had unfortunate consequences. Shoehorning everything related to 
science and the social into the literature on values in science has distorted the targets of 
investigation and generated a hidden multiplicity of ways in which choices are claimed to involve 
values. If this is right, more room needs to be made in philosophy of science for other topics. 
Discussion about the role of values in science will improve when other work on science, society, 
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